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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 890149-CA

vs.
Category No. 2
WALTER KENT BINGHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2(a)-3(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated, 198788.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
Defendant appeals his conviction for a Third Degree Felony,
Theft by Receiving, in violation of Section 76-6-408 and 412,
Utah Criminal Code, as amended.

Defendant entered a plea of not

guilty to the Information and was found guilty by a jury on the
25th day of August, 1987.

Sentence was pronounced nunc pro tunc

on the 15th day of February, 1989, effective the 18th day of
September, 1987.

Notice of Appeal was filed on or about the 9th

day of March, 1989.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
WAS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE SUFFICIENT TO
CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF THEFT BY RECEIVING WHERE THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE PRESENTED THAT THE PROPERTY IN POSSESSION OF THE
DEFENDANT HAD BEEN STOLEN.
STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-4-408 and Section 76-4-412.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On

or

about

the

17th

day

of

January

of

1987,

a law

enforcement officer was on patrol in Utah County when he observed
a vehicle commit a traffic offense.

The officer followed the

vehicle west bound and clocked a speed running is excess of the
posted speed limit.

The officer put his overhead lights on and

stopped the vehicle approximately one mile from where he had
initially

signaled

by

use

of

his

overhead

lights.

As he

approached the vehicle, he noticed two people in the vehicle and
observed what he perceived to be suspicious movements by the
passenger

and

driver

of the vehicle.

Upon

approaching

the

vehicle, the officer could see several cartons of cigarettes in
the vehicle.

Upon a subsequent search of the vehicle in keeping

with the inventory policy of the County Sheriff's Office, the
officer found approximately thirty (30) cartons of cigarettes.
(T.R. 20-30)
The State called an individual named Bob Tulin who indicated
he was the supervisor for Southland Corporation 7-Eleven Stores
who testified that each of the 7-Eleven stores was assigned a
five-digit number which are stamped on each carton of cigarettes
delivered to the store by the parent corporation.
further testified that thirty
numbers

stamped

on

them

Mr. Tulin

(30) cartons of cigarettes had

which

could

be

so

identified,

and

identified the thirty (30) cartons as having been delivered to
five (5) different 7-Eleven stores, one (1) in Pleasant Grove,
three (3) in Orem, and one (1) in Springville.
2

(T.R. 46-50)

In addition to the officers involved in the stop and search
of

the

vehicle,

Corporation

and

head

the

office,

additional witness.

representative
Mr.

Tulin,

the

of

the

State

Southland
called

one

Lyndalee Pratter testified that she was the

owner of the vehicle, that the Defendant has borrowed her vehicle
and that at the time he borrowed the vehicle from the witness
there were not any cartons of cigarettes in the vehicle.

There

was no testimony presented at all that the cartons of cigarettes
were, in fact, stolen.
reports

of

stolen

There was no testimony concerning any

property

or

any

property

missing

from

inventories of any of the stores identified as being the stores
to whom the cartons of cigarettes found in Defendant's vehicle
were delivered.
At the conclusion of the Statefs case, counsel

for the

Defendant moved for a dismissal of the Information on the basis
that there was insufficient evidence presented by the State upon
which the jury could determine that the property had been stolen.
(T.R. 56)

The Court denied Defendant's motion and required the

case to proceed.
arrested
matter

without

was

(T.R. 59-60)
presenting

submitted

to

the

any

Counsel for Defendant then
additional

evidence

and

the

jury with the result that the

Defendant was found guilty by the jury of the offense.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The motion of the Defendant to dismiss at the conclusion of
the State's case for failure of the State to introduce sufficient
evidence upon which the jury could find that a theft had been
3

committed

should

have

been

granted,

and

further,

there was

insufficient evidence upon which the jury could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that a theft had been committed.
POINT I
THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE
UPON WHICH THE JURY COULD FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF THEFT BY RECEIVING
The elements of the crime of theft by receiving are set
forth in the case of State v. Ramon, 736 P.2d 1059 (1987).

Under

the Ramon decision, the following elements must be present:
1.
2.

Property belonging to another has been stolen;
The defendant received, retained or disposed of the

stolen property;
3.

At the time of receiving, retaining or disposing of the

property, the defendant knew or believed the property was
stolen; and
4.

Defendant

acted purposely

to deprive

the owner of

possession of the property.
In the present case, the Defendant submits that the State
failed to present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could
properly find and base a finding of guilt as to two of the
foregoing elements.

First, there was no evidence that property

belonging to another had been stolen.

The only witness called to

identify the ownership of the property was Mr. Tulin from the
Southland Corporation who could only testify that thirty (30) of
the cartons of cigarettes found in possession of the Defendant
had

been

distributed

at

some

unspecified
4

time

to

five

(5)

different 7-Eleven stores in the Utah County area.

There is no

testimony as to when that distribution was made, no testimony
that any of the stores to whom the deliveries of cigarettes were
made had claimed any loss or was missing any of the property from
its

inventory.

Additionally,

the

only

evidence

of

any

identification on the cigarettes which would distinguish them as
belonging to the 7-Eleven stores was a five-digit number known
only to the employees of the Southland Corporation.
Further,

the

element

number

three

provides

that

the

defendant at the time of receiving must have known or believed
that

the

property

was

stolen.

There

is

no

evidence

that

Defendant had or should have possessed such knowledge as the mere
presence of the cartons of cigarettes in the vehicle would not
give rise to any indication that they belonged to anyone else
and,

in

fact,

there

was

no

testimony

that

they

were

not

legitimately purchased and were the subject of theft.
State v. Knill. 656 P.2d 1026 (1982) cites the case of State
v. Hall. 105 Utah 162, 145 P. 2d 494, for the proposition that
goods found in defendant's possession must be identified as the
goods which are charged to have been stolen.

State v. Franks.

649 P. 2d 3 (1982) indicates that the burden is upon the State to
show

unauthorized

authorized control.

control,

not

upon

the

defendant

to

show

At the time of the motion to dismiss on the

part of the Defendant for failure of the State to prove the
allegations of the Information, there was not sufficient evidence
in the record upon which the jurors could find that the elements
5

as set forth above were present.

The State at that point had not

even demonstrated a prima facia case of theft since two of the
essential elements were lacking.
Further, after this Court has previously stated in the case
of State v. Lactod, 90 Ut. Adv. Rep. 46, as follows:
We review the evidence and all inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the verdict of the jury.
We reverse a jury
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted.
Facts of this case are not in dispute or refuted in the
evidence.

A jury is instructed that they must find all of the

elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

Two of those elements are as

set forth above, to wit: that the defendant received, retained or
disposed of the property of 7-Eleven stores and that at the time
he did so, it was done with knowledge that the property was
stolen

or

Instruction

believing
No.

5)

it

probably

The

had

record

been

contains

stolen.
no

(Jury

evidence

to

demonstrate either of those two elements were present upon which
a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of the
two aforementioned elements.

Without evidence of both of those

elements, the conviction of the Defendant cannot be sustained.
CONCLUSION
The trial court should have granted Defendants motion to
dismiss for lack of evidence that the property in the possession
of

the

Defendant

was

stolen

and

that,

at

the

time he was

possession of said property, the Defendant knew or should have
6

known that it was stolen.
might

be

drawn

to

suggest

Any evidence from which inferences
or

infer

those

elements

is

so

inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that fact and the
conviction of a jury based on such evidence should be reversed.
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction upon the basis of insufficiency of the evidence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $ £

^day of July, 1989.

MICHAEL D. ESPLIN
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, four copies
of the foregoing Appellate Brief to Mr. R. Paul Van Dam, Utah
Attorney General, at 235 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114
this
?P5~~ day of July, 1989.
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76-6-407

CRIMINAL CODE

reer, financial condition, reputation, or personal
relationships.
1973

76-6-407. Theft of lost, mislaid, or mistakenly
delivered property.
A person commits theft when:
(1) He obtains property of another which he
knows to have been lost or mislaid, or to have
been delivered under a mistake as to the identity
of the recipient or as to the nature or amount of
the property, without taking reasonable measures to return it to the owner; and
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the owner of
the property when he obtains the property or at
any time prior to taking the measures designated
in paragraph (1).
1973
76-6-408.

Receiving stolen property — Duties of
pawnbrokers.
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains,
or disposes of the property of another knowing that it
has been stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids
in concealing, selling, or withholding any such property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for paragraph
(1) is presumed in the case of an actor who:
(a) Is found in possession or control of other
property stolen on a separate occasion; or
(b) Has received other stolen property within
the year preceding the receiving offense charged;
or
(c) Being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed, acquires it for a
consideration which he knows is far below its
reasonable value.
(d) Is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or
an agent, employee or representative of the
pawnbroker or person who buys, receives or obtains property and fails to require the seller or
person delivering the property to certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the property. If the value given for the property, exceeds
$20 the pawnbroker or person shall also require
the seller or person delivering the property to
obtain a legible print, preferably the right
thumb, at the bottom of the certificate next to his
signature and at least one other positive form of
identification.
(i) Every pawnbroker or person who has
or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, employee or
representative of the pawnbroker or person
who fails to comply with the requirements of
(d) shall be presumed to have bought, received or obtained the property knowing it to
have been stolen or unlawfully obtained.
This presumption may be rebutted by proof
(ii) When in a prosecution under this section it appears from the evidence that the
defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who
has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or
personal property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or
person, that the defendant bought, received,
concealed or withheld the property without
requiring the person from whom he bought,

100

received, or obtained the property to sign the
certificate required in paragraph (d) and in
the event the transaction involves an
amount exceeding $20 also place his legible
print, preferably the right thumb, on the certificate, then the burden shall be upon the
defendant to show that the property bought,
received or obtained was not stolen.
(3) As used in this section:
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession,
control, or title or lending on the security of the
property;
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of
buying or selling goods.
1979
76-6-409. Theft of services.
( 1 ) A person commits theft if he obtains services
which he knows are available only for compensation
by deception, threat, force, or any other means designed to avoid the due payment for them.
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over
the disposition of services of another, to which he
knows he is not entitled, he diverts the services to his
own benefit or to the benefit of another who he knows
is not entitled to them.
(3) In this section, "services" includes, but is not
limited to, labor, professional service, public utility
and transportation services, restaurant, hotel, motel,
tourist cabin, rooming house, and like accommodations, the supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or
trailers for temporary use, telephone or telegraph service, steam, admission to entertainment, exhibitions,
sporting events, or other events for which a charge is
made.
(4) Under this section, "services" includes gas,
electricity, water, or sewer, only if the services are
obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception not
described in Section 76-6-409.3.
1967
76-6*409.1.

Devices for theft of services — Sei-

zure and destruction — Civil actions
for damage*.
( D A person may not knowingly:
(a) make or possess any instrument, apparatus, equipment, or device for the use of, or for the
purpose of, committing or attempting to commit
theft under Section 76-6-409 or 76-6-409.3; or
(b) sell, offer to sell, advertise, give, transport,
or otherwise transfer to another any information,
instrument, apparatus, equipment, or device, or
any information, plan, or instruction for obtaining, making, or assembling the same, with intent
that it be used, or caused to be used, to commit or
attempt to commit theft under Section 76-6-409
or 76-6-409.3.
.(2) (a) Any information, instrument, apparatus,
equipment, or device, or information, plan, or instruction referred to in Subsection (1) may be
seized pursuant to a court order, lawful search
and seizure, lawful arrest, or other lawful process.
(b) Upon the conviction of any person for a violation of any provision of this section, any information, instrument, apparatus, equipment, device, plan, or instruction shall be destroyed as
contraband by the sheriff of the county in which
the person was convicted.
(3) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) or (2) is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
(4) Criminal prosecutions under this section do not
affect any person's right of civil action for redress for

101

CRIMINAL CODE

damages suffered as a result of any violation of this
section.
1M7
76-6-409.3. Theft of utility services.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Owner" includes any part-owner, joint
owner, tenant in common, joint tenant, or tenant
by the entirety of the whole or a part of any
building and the property on which it is located.
(b) "Person" means any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company, association, or
other legal entity.
(c) "Tenant or occupant" includes any person,
including the owner, who occupies the whole or
part of any building, whether alone or with
others.
(d) "Utility" means any public utility, municipally-owned utility, or cooperative utility which
provides electricity, gas, water, or sewer, or any
combination of them, for sale to consumers.
(2) A person is guilty of theft of a utility service if
he commits any of the following acts which make gas,
electricity, water, or sewer available to a tenant or
occupant, including himself, without the payment of
full compensation to the utility. Any person aiding
and abetting in these prohibited acts is a principal
and is so punishable. Prohibited acts include:
(a) connecting any tube, pipe, wire, or other
instrument with any meter, device, or other instrument used for conducting gas, electricity,
water, or sewer in a manner as permits the use of
the gas, electricity, water, or sewer without its
passing through a meter or other instrument recording the usage for billing;
(b) altering, injuring, or preventing the normal action of a meter, valve, stopcock, or other
instrument used for measuring quantities of gas,
electricity, water, or sewer service;
(c) reconnecting gas, electricity, water, or
sewer connections or otherwise restoring service
when one or more of those utilities have been
lawfully disconnected or turned off by the provider of the utility service;
(d) intentionally breaking, defacing, or causing to be broken or defaced any seal, locking device, or other part of a metering device for recording usage of gas, electricity, water, or sewer service, or a security system for the recording device;
(e) removing a metering device designed to
measure quantities of gas, electricity, water, or
sewer service;
(f) transferring from one location to another a
metering device for measuring quantities of public utility services of gas, electricity, water, or
sewer service;
(g) changing the indicated consumption, jamming the measuring device, bypassing the meter
or measuring device with a jumper so that it does
not indicate use or registers use incorrectly, or
otherwise obtaining quantities of gas, electricity,
water, or sewer service from the utility without
their passing through a metering device for measuring quantities of consumption for billing purposes;
(h) using a metering device belonging to the
utility that has not been assigned to the location
and installed by the utility; or
(i) fabricating or using a device to pick or otherwise tamper with the locks used to deter utility
service diversion, meter tampering, and meter

76-6-412

(3) The presence on property in the possession of a
person of any device or alteration which permits the
diversion or use of utility service to avoid the registration of the use by or on a meter installed by the
utility or to otherwise avoid the recording of use of
the service for payment gives rise to a presumption
that the person in possession of the property installed
the device or caused the alteration if:
(a) the presence of the device or alteration can
be attributed only to a deliberate act in furtherance of an intent to avoid payment for utility
service; and
(b) the person charged has received the direct
benefit of the reduction of the cost of the utility
service.
(4) A person who violates this section is guilty of
the offense of theft of utility service. If the value of
the gas, electricity, water, or sewer service is:
(a) up to $250, the offense is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) greater than $250 but not more titan
$1,000, the offense is a third degree felony;
(c) greater than $1,000, or if the offender has
previously been convicted of a violation of this
section, the offense is a second degree felony.
(5) A person who violates this section shall make
restitution to the utility for the value of the gas, electricity, water, or sewer service consumed in violation
of this section plus all reasonable expenses and costs
incurred on account of the violation of this section.
Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and
costs for investigation, disconnection, reconnection,
service calls, employee time, and equipment use.
(6) Criminal prosecution under this section does
not affect the right of a utility to bring a civil action
for redness for damages suffered as a result of the
commission of any of the acts prohibited by this section.
(7) This section does not abridge or alter any other
right, action, or remedy otherwise available to a utility.
19S7

76-6-410. Theft by person having custody of
property pursuant to repair or rental
agreement.
(1) A person is guilty of thefl if:
(a) Having custody of property pursuant to an
agreement between himself or another and the
owner thereof whereby the actor or another is to
perform for compensation a specific service for
the owner involving the maintenance, repair, or
use of such property, he intentionally uses or operates it, without the consent of the owner, for
his own purposes in a manner constituting a
gross deviation from the agreed purpose; or

(b) Having custody of any property pursuant
to a rental or lease agreement where it is to be
returned in a specified manner or at a specified
time, intentionally fails to comply with the terms
of the agreement concerning return so as to render such failure a gross deviation from the agreement,
ltra
76-6-411. Repealed.

if74

76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses —
Action for treble damages against receiver of stolen property.
(1) Thefl of property and services as provided in
this chapter shall be punishable as follows
(a) As a felony of the second degree if:
(i) The value of the property or services
exceeds $1,000; or

CRIMINAL CODE

76-6-601

(ii) The property stolen is a firearm or an
operable motor vehicle; or
(iii) The actor is armed with a deadly
weapon at the time of the theft; or
(iv) The property is stolen from the person
of another.
(b) As a felony of the third degree if:
(i) The value of the property or services is
more than $250 but not more than $1,000; or
(ii) The actor has been twice before convicted of theft of property or services valued
at $250 or less; or
(iii) When the property taken is a stallion,
mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox,
bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny,
swine, or poultry.
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of
the property stolen was more than $100 but does
not exceed $250.
(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value of
the property stolen was $100 or less.
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation
of Subsection (1), of Section 76-6-408 may bring an
action against any person mentioned in (d) for three
times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained
by the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fe08.
1*77
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Financial transaction card offenses —
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Financial transaction card offenses —
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banking device — False application
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Financial transaction card offenses —
Unlawful acquisition, possession or
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Financial transaction card offenses —
Property obtained by unlawful conduct.
Financial transaction card offenses —
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Bribery of a labor official.
Bribe receiving by a labor official.
Defrauding creditors.
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Unlawful dealing with property by fiduciary.

Section
76-6-515.
76-6-516.
76-6-517.
76-6-518.
76-6-519.
76-6-520.
76-6-521.

102
Using or making slugs.
Conveyance of real estate by married
man without wife's consent.
Making a false credit report.
Criminal simulation.
Repealed.
Criminal usury.
False or fraudulent insurance claim —
Punishment as for theft.

76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined.
( 1 ) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) Alters any writing of another without his
authority or utters any such altered writing; or
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates,
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing
so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the
act of another, whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at
a time or place or in a numbered sequence other
than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method of recording information,
checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value,
right, privilege, or identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the
writing is or purports to be:
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government, or
any agency thereof; or
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or
more, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in
or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest
in or claim against any person or enterprise.
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the
writing is or purports to be a check with a face
amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class
A misdemeanor.
i*7&
76-6-502.

P o s s e s s i o n of forged writing or d e v i c e
for writing.
Any person who, with intent to defraud, knowingly
possesses any writing that is a forgery as defined in
Section 76-6-501, or who with intent to defraud knowingly possesses any device for making any such writing, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, except
where the altering, making, completion, execution,
issuance, transfer, publication, or utterance of such
writing would constitute a class A misdemeanor, in
which event the possession of the writing or device for
making such a writing shall constitute a class A misdemeanor.
1974
76-6-503.

Fraudulent handling of recordable
writings.
(1) Any person who with intent to deceive or injure
anyone falsifies, destroys, removes, or conceals any
will, deed, mortgage, security instrument, or other
writing for which the law provides public recording is
guilty of fraudulent handling of recordable writings.
(2) Fraudulent handling of recordable writings is a
felony of the third degree.
1S7S

76-6-504. Tampering with records.
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(g) those matters described in Subsection (3Xa)
through (i).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3Kb).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
itss
78-2-3. Repealed.

ltftt

78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, Judges
pro tempore, and practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for use in the courts of the state
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and
admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the
practice of law, including admission to practice law
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
the practice of law.
ISM
78-2-5. Repealed.

itss

78*2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint
clerks and support staff as necesssiry for the operation
of the Supreme Court and the Count of Appeals. The
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be established by the appellate court administrator, and
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court.

10-4U-0

the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge whose term expires
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in that office no more than two successive
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and pireside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the
same as for the Supreme Court.
itss

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
isst all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro78-2-7. Repealed.
its* cess necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
The court may at any time require the attendance
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
and services of any sheriff in the stale.
lass
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed.
isss.isss
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of inforCHAPTER 2a
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, exCOURT OF APPEALS
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Section
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
(b) appeals from the district court review of
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
Filing fees.
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies;
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court.
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals.
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
There is created a court known as the Court of Aprecord in criminal cases, except those involving a
peals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
shall have a seal.
IMS
(0 appeals from district court in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Funcfirst degree or capital felony;
tions — Filing fees..
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges.
traordinary wiits involving a criminal convicThe term of appointment to office as a judge of the
tion, except those involving a first degree or capiCourt of Appeals is until the first general election
tal felony;
held more than three years after the effective date of

